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This paper explores the limitations of conventional economic analysis of intergenerational 
problems and examines some of the alternatives suggested in the literature. It is argued that 
proper consideration of future generations has at least three requirements. First, when future 
costs and benefits are considered, it should be taken into account that they are to be enjoyed by 
different generations. Second, the sustainability requirement should be adopted. This represents 
an equity commitment to the future and implies the recognition that future generations have the 
right to nondeteriorated ecological and economic capacity. The paper studies the ways in which 
the recognition of these rights might be incorporated into economic evaluation and 
management. Third, an appropriate institutional network to enforce the recognition of these 
rights in decision-making processes should be constituted. Its design and necessary functions 
are also analyzed. 
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1. Introduction: discounting and future generations 
 
Conventional evaluation and management methods have been widely criticized because 
of their implied discrimination against the interests of future generations. This has been 
particularly stressed in the recent literature of climate change (e.g. Azar, 1998; Chapman and 
Khanna, 2000). For a proper consideration of future generations in economic analysis, it would 
seem to be necessary to overcome several limitations of conventional analysis. 
One of the points that has generated most controversy is discounting. Conventional 
economic analysis gives less importance to the flows that take place in the future. There are 
justifications for such discounting as well as numerous criticisms (for reviews see Markandya 
and Pearce, 1988; and Price, 1993). The application of discounting devalues and practically 
removes from the analysis the impacts that occur in the distant future. As a consequence, 
projects with distant costs and prompt benefits are strongly favored, while distant benefits are 
strongly devalued. Therefore, the choice of a discount rate has strong implications on the 
distribution of well-being between generations. Broome (1992), Cline (1992), Nordhaus (1994), 
and Fankhauser (1994) agree about the importance of this choice for the prescribed level of 
mitigation of greenhouse gases. A higher discount rate implies a greater discrimination against 
future generations (and so lower abatement of greenhouse gases), although any positive 
discount rate leads the analysis to strongly devalue and almost ignore distant impacts.  
However, there is not a unique relationship between discounting and environmental 
degradation. If the discount rate applied influences the global investment level, a low rate would 
lead to a high investment. On the one hand, this would lead to higher capital endowment 
bequeathed to future generations, but on the other hand, it would imply greater use of natural 
resources and greater environmental degradation (Pearce and Turner, 1990). This last argument 
creates doubts about the final effect of conventional discounting on the environment. 





avoided or properly accounted and compensated, higher investment should not entail greater 
environmental degradation. 
Conventional cost-benefit analysis discounts all future impacts by applying the time 
preference as if they happened to present individuals. This procedure ignores the fact that 
society is composed of mortal individuals of different generations.
1
 When a project extends over 
several generations, it does not seem justified to apply the time discounting of those who started 
it as if society were made up of immortal individuals. There is a big difference between 
considering the efficient allocation of consumption during one’s own life span and considering 
the potential consumption by future generations. The lack of consideration that discounting 
implies for future generations is not based on any equity criterion but on a rather arbitrary 
extension of time preferences of present generations beyond their existence. The discounting 
justified on the decreasing marginal utility of consumption because of economic growth also 
meets with problems. Applying a discount rate based on the assumption of future prosperity 
might jeopardize this assumed prosperity by giving a low weight to future impacts (the 
‘optimist’s paradox’). In addition, if discounting is applied to future individuals because they 
are thought to be richer, this reasoning would also justify the weighting of present individuals 
depending on their wealth, which is rarely done (Azar and Sterner, 1996). 
Some authors argue that markets reflect individual preferences, and that the approaches 
incorporating market discount rates are adequate. However, several problems prevent markets 
from reflecting altruistic preferences appropriately. According to the ‘isolation paradox’ an 
individual will sacrifice consumption to benefit future generations only if the guarantee exists 
that others will also do so (Baumol, 1952). Sen (1961) compares the transfers to future 
generations with the prisoner’s dilemma: it would be optimal for the individual if others invest, 
while one would be better off without investing. The concern about future generations takes on 
public good characteristics. The reason is that individuals benefit from other people’s transfers, 





incentives to make appropriate transfers to future generations. Therefore, the market does not 
lead to an efficient intergenerational allocation. 
The market rate of interest does not reflect the preferences of individuals regarding the 
well-being of their descendants. Furthermore, conventional calculations of the social rate of 
discount based on individual time preferences also obviate future generations well-being. In 
fact, they even ignore the existence of different generations, adopting the ‘immortality 
assumption’. The weights to apply to future generations should reflect the altruistic preferences 
of society and not just be an arbitrary extension of the time preferences of the present. 
Nevertheless, the consideration of altruistic preferences does not guarantee that the 
interests of future generations are appropriately protected. The unborn have neither political 
power nor representatives. When considering actions that can seriously affect several 
generations, the legitimacy of taking only into account the preferences of present generations 
should be questioned in order to assure the commitment to equity between generations that 
sustainability represents. If future generations have certain rights that should be respected, these 
rights should be included in the analysis. This paper studies the ways this recognition of rights 
might be incorporated into economic evaluation and management. 
The present article is organized as follows. Section 2 reviews some alternatives to 
discounting that have appeared in the literature. Section 3 analyses the limits of mainstream 
economics regarding sustainability. Section 4 proposes an alternative approach assuming 
sustainability as an equity commitment to the future. Section 5 presents the evaluation process 
incorporating this requirement. Section 6 studies the necessary reform and creation of 
institutions for a sustainable management of resources. Section 7 concludes. 
 
2. Alternatives to avoid the damage discounting applies to future generations 
 
                                                                                                                                                                          
1 Ramsey (1928, p. 543) already claimed that discounting the consumption of future generations for pure time 





Several authors argue that the social discount rate should be lowered in projects with 
important intergenerational effects (e.g. Daly and Cobb, 1989; Cline, 1993). On the one hand, 
sound arguments justify an adjustment of the market rate in order to obtain the appropriate 
social rate. The market rate of interest does not consider in a proper way questions such as 
externalities or public goods, among others, and some authors argue that it is necessary to adjust 
it (e.g. Marglin, 1963). On the other hand, what is not correct at all is to use an arbitrarily 
chosen low discount rate for favoring future generations. This reduces the choice of the discount 
rate to choosing the one that leads to a result that has been previously decided, and therefore 
removes any objectivity or scientific rigor from the evaluation process. The important question 
should be determining the appropriate criteria and processes that should follow the decision 
process. As Howarth and Norgaard (1993, p. 339) note, cost-benefit analysis is properly 
concerned with allocative efficiency while concerns for distribution should be addressed by 
following principles of intergenerational justice. The mere use of an arbitrary low discount rate 
leads the analysis to obviate the preferences between present and future consumption and to 
invest in projects with inferior returns. In any case, this type of proposal is unable to incorporate 
the interests of future generations into the analysis. 
Fisher and Krutilla (1975) develop a methodology that applies a ‘growth factor’ to the 
benefits of resource conservation and a ‘decrease factor’ to the benefits of exploiting it. The idea 
is that the natural resources that become scarcer have a growing relative price, while the benefits 
of its exploitation diminish as new technologies appear. Weitzman (1994) also argues that at 
higher economic development, environmental impacts will be more important, because of both 
their physical relevance and their valuation. This fact should affect the level and the temporal 
profile of the ‘environmental discount rate’, making it smaller than the market rate and 
declining. Tol (1994), Rabl (1996) and Hasselmann (1999) use similar arguments for valuing 
climate change impacts. However, these arguments imply a change not in the conventional use 
of time discounting but in the appropriate valuation of impacts, and they maintain many 
limitations (such as assuming perfect substitutability). The adjustment for the reasons they 





Furthermore, they do not solve the fundamental concern of this article, the explicit consideration 
of future generations interests. 
The ‘modified discount method’ of Kula (1988) explicitly incorporates into the analysis 
the different generations affected by each project under consideration. First, it discounts the 
consumption flows enjoyed by each generation through their time preference. Then, it obtains 
the total profitability of the project, adding up the discounted flows of each generation. This 
method gives the same weight to all generations, which implies ignoring the preferences of most 
of the components of present society. 
There is a group of proposals that basically consists in the weighting of the discounted 
flows of the different generations (Nijkamp and Rouwendal, 1988; Bellinger, 1991; Pasqual, 
1999).  These proposals reflect the fact that society prefers its own consumption to the 
consumption of future generations. Collard (1981) affirms that it is appropriate to let each 
generation apply its time discount and then consider the consumption of future generations 
through a weighting that shows society’s altruistic preferences.  
If the intergenerational weighting reflected altruistic intergenerational preferences, the 
analysis would gain in efficiency, since the benefits to be enjoyed by future generations would 
be considered by following social preferences. What happens in other solutions is that the 
consumption of the future is weighted in a rather arbitrary way. This is the case with 
conventional discounting, where the time preference of the individuals of the initial society is 
extended to future generations. However, even if altruistic preferences were correctly 
accounted, this would not imply that sustainability or any other equity criterion were completed.  
To appropriately address the problem of intergenerational equity, more than modifying 
the discount or the weights applied to the different generations, it is essential to overcome the 
limitations of conventional economic analysis in relation to a sustainable development. Some of 
these limitations are discussed in the next section. 
 






3.1. Intergenerational externalities 
Intergenerational problems arise due to the fact that present actions determine the 
economic and ecological capacity that the future will inherit. There are externalities between 
generations because future generations do not participate in decisions that will affect them. 
These externalities have some peculiarities. The unborn are unable to defend their interests in 
current decision making: they cannot bid in present markets, nor can they participate in the 
political process. Furthermore, present decisions can have an irreversible nature. Thus, future 
generations must resign themselves to suffering the consequences of present actions. 
Conventional analysis considers that externalities are market failures. But in this case 
what occurs is market nonexistence. Thus, conventional solutions are not valid. In particular, the 
‘Coasian’ analysis is out of place: there is no possible agreement between the parts because 
future generations are not present nor represented either. As for the ‘Pigouvian’ solution, it is 
based on a hypothetical market valuation in which the future cannot participate, so the values 
given to the future would be arbitrary. Furthermore, the internalization of these externalities 
depends on the will of institutions where future generations are not represented. Therefore, a 
much deeper institutional modification than the classic market adjustments is necessary. First of 
all, what should be questioned is the legitimacy of a conventional analysis where the same 
existence of the future is included as something contingent to present preferences. 
 
3.2. Economic efficiency 
The efficiency in the allocation of resources of conventional analysis refers to a market 
in which the only preferences expressed in some way are those of present generations. It implies 
discounting the future, and as was shown above, favors the imposition of strong costs to the 
future and puts in danger its economic and ecological capacity. Conventional analysis also 
adopts the Hicks-Kaldor compensation test, which involves that if the benefits of a project are 
higher than the costs it is efficient to undertake it independently of who gains and who loses. 





also hardly justifiable in many intragenerational cases. The question is who gives present 
generations the right to impose strong ecological damages on future generations? In the absence 
of effective compensation it seems at least a quite contestable premise. Many authors also argue 
that ecological damages to future generations cannot be compensated by doing them some other 
good (Sen, 1982; Barry, 1991; Spash, 1994; Azar, 2000). 
Economic theory posits that there are as many efficient solutions as initial distributions 
of resources considered.
2
 However, the usual procedures take as appropriate the initial 
endowment of resources and put all the emphasis on the search for efficiency. But the efficient 
intergenerational allocation depends on which initial endowment of resources is assumed. 
Economic analysis can consider different distributions, but moral considerations about the rights 
of the future have to be included in order to decide which is the most appropriate.  
Conventional economic analysis implicitly assumes that the Earth and all its resources 
belong exclusively to present individuals. What is more, the present has the power of deciding 
how to use these resources. As a consequence, the endowment that will reach the hands of 
future generations is just a residual of the decisions of present individuals and not the result of a 
negotiation or market including the interested parties. Although there are altruistic preferences, 
these do not solve the problem. For a satisfactory solution, both parts (present and future) 
should arrive at an agreement (which is certainly not possible) or make explicit the recognition 
of certain rights to future generations based on moral grounds (such as human rights), and act 
accordingly.  
The efficiency in the allocation of resources is an essential requirement to facilitate that 
a waste of resources or an excessive discharge of residuals is avoided. Also, an efficient 
economy allows increasing the standard of life of present and future individuals. Nevertheless, 
being a necessary criterion for proper evaluation and management, its application should be 
limited whenever it conflicts with sustainability. 
 
                                                          





3.3. Intragenerational equity and sustainable development 
Both market valuations and environmental valuation methods in use depend critically 
on the income distribution of individuals (Martínez-Alier and Roca, 2000). Poor people, as 
happens with future generations, do not have any way of expressing their preferences in a 
market that measures them in monetary units. The social acceptability of these valuations 
depends on the social acceptability of the existent distribution. Also, it might be more adequate 
to ask people as citizens and not as consumers when valuing public goods (Sagoff, 1988). In 
some decisions, premises like ‘one person one vote’, or the recognition of certain rights, can be 
considered more legitimate than market valuations. 
It is not correct to talk about development in situations where a good portion of society 
is prevented from enjoying a decent quality of life. What is more, if social injustice were serious 
enough it could become incompatible with the sustainability of the system. In many countries 
poverty leads to an unsustainable use of the environment. Other countries, instead, reach their 
development by imposing unsustainability in less developed regions (Pearce et al., 1989). In 
fact, rich countries have created their prosperity through an appropriation and unsustainable use 
of global resources. There is a sound reason for justifying the contention that the costs of 
abating global environmental problems (such as climate change) must be borne by rich 
countries: they are historically responsible for this ecological debt that all countries now suffer 
(Turner, 1993; Martínez-Alier, 1998). 
To sum up, the search for sustainable development is close linked to the solution of 
problems of inequity that could endanger sustainability and are against the same concept of 
development. 
 
3.4. Interdependence between economic and ecological systems 
Generally, when economists talk about efficiency in the allocation of resources they 
usually consider only one of the functions of the environment: the provision of resources. But 
when talking about sustainability all the economic functions of the environment should be 





but also by using it as a dump for residual assimilation. Economic activity can also modify the 
leisure and enjoyment function of the environment, and even more gravely, it can alter the 
global function of life-support. The entropic nature of the economic system has to be considered 
(Martínez-Alier, 1991). 
We are not fully aware of the effects of our behavior on the environment, or of the 
effects that a change in the environmental system could have on the economy. If we want to 
maintain the sustainability of the socioeconomic system, human activity should not work by 
endangering the ecological sustainability. Therefore, beyond the usual efficiency criterion, 
present behavior should follow more cautious criteria. Some authors argue that the economy 
(especially in some regions) has exceeded the size ecological systems can tolerate and that there 
is an urgent necessity of reducing the scale of economic activity (Daly and Cobb, 1989). 
The evaluation and management methods used until now have led to an 
overexploitation of the environment. Renewable resources are being used above their 
regeneration rate, depletable resources are being exploited without taking into account their 
limited existences and, even worse, the assimilative capacity of the environment has been 
seriously exceeded. This overexploitation has seriously affected the life-support function of 
natural systems, causing global environmental alterations such as the ozone layer depletion, 
climate change and biodiversity loss. The final repercussions of these changes on human beings 
is uncertain, although it is obvious that they are far-reaching as shown by the available evidence 
on global warming (IPCC, 2001). 
 
3.5. Irreversibility, uncertainty, and ignorance 
The irreversibility of current decisions can affect the capacity of the environment to 
provide its functions, seriously harming the natural legacy left to future generations. Thus, 
sustainable development requires imposing limits on the decisions that may involve 
irreversibilities. 
There are well-developed probabilistic models of expected utility for dealing with risk 





the probabilities can be statistically defined. Nevertheless, they are of little help in cases of 
uncertainty where the possible effects of current decisions are not known and it is not possible 
to assign probabilities. If the effects on future generations are not known, it seems even more 
unlikely that they can be assigned a correct monetary value. In many cases there is uncertainty 
about the possible irreversibility of given decisions. This leads to the necessity of considering 
alternative (or complementary) approaches to conventional cost-benefit analysis in order to 




3.6. Substitution possibilities 
Although conventional economics assumes infinite substitution possibilities, this is not 
based on anything but intuition or faith (or simply because it facilitates an easily tractable 
model). It does not seem feasible to substitute some essential services like those provided by the 
ozone layer or the carbon cycle. The natural environment has more functions than just providing 
resources, which are less susceptible of being substituted. While substitution possibilities are 
greater regarding the function of provision of resources at small scale, when global ecological 
systems are affected, it is possible to create instabilities and chain reactions with unpredictable 
effects. There are critical levels of some goods, and thresholds that, if surpassed, may cause 
important alterations (Muradian, 2001). The equity between generations needs the protection of 
these critical levels, as well as of certain essential processes of the ecosystems. The ignorance 
concerning the future about technological capacity, preferences and, above all, the uncertainty 
regarding the effects that present actions have on the complex dynamics of natural systems 
suggests that it might not be possible to compensate indefinitely any reduction of the quality or 
the quantity of natural resources. In any case, ecological, biological and medical sciences 
(among others) and not just the beliefs of some economists should provide information about 
the possibilities of substitution. 
                                                          
3 Woodward and Bishop (1997) show that in case of pure uncertainty the ‘precautionary principle’ (O’ Riordan and 
Jordan, 1995) and the ‘safe minimum standard’ (Ciriacy-Wantrup, 1952; Bishop, 1978) arise as rational decisions and 





Summing up, following only the efficiency criterion in the management of natural 
resources (as conventional economics does) leads in all probability to an unsustainable outcome. 
A commitment for a sustainable development requires paying greater attention to the 
interrelation between the economy and the ecology in which the former acts. Equity 
considerations, irreversibility and uncertainty problems, and substitution limitations must all be 
taken into greater account. All of this requires a thorough modification of current decision-
making and management methods and institutions. 
 
4. Sustainability as an equity commitment to the future 
 
4.1. The recognition of rights to the future 
Is it legitimate to assume that the possible existence of the necessary conditions to allow 
life in the future must depend on the preferences expressed in present (real or hypothetical) 
markets? This section focuses on the intergenerational equity problem by questioning the 
legitimacy of assuming that present generations have all the rights on environmental goods and 
services and do not have any obligation towards future generations. First of all, it is necessary to 
determine from which distribution of rights the analysis begins. 
On the one hand there are statements such as: “...past generations are no longer here, 
and those to come will come because we want them to come. Saying it brutally, the world 
belongs to those now alive and to nobody else.” (Mas-Colell, 1994, p. 200, my translation). In 
spite of its very strong connotations of inequity and injustice between generations, this is the 
premise implicitly taken in conventional economics. 
On the other hand there is the consideration that future generations have certain rights 
and, consequently, the present has certain obligations towards the future. These rights can be 
derived from moral, contractual or deontological approaches. Much of sustainability literature 





long course of time, in other words, compatible with a minimum of intergenerational equity.
4
 
The most popular definition states that sustainable development is the “…development that 
meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future generations to meet 
their own needs.” (WCED, 1987, p. 43). This definition implies limiting the present use of 
resources. Nevertheless, it is open to diverse interpretations because these needs are not 
precisely defined. 
Strong ethical, moral, philosophical, cultural, contractual, or deontological justifications 
lead to rejection of the premise ‘everything belongs to the present’ as a legitimate starting point. 
Conventional analysis takes as the only relevant reality the one reflected by the market, arguing 
that this is not value laden. But this option implies both denying any right to the unborn since 
they cannot participate in present markets, and accepting that the present can do whatever it 
pleases without any limit, which is certainly strongly value laden. In order to respect the 
interests of future generations, present actions should be bounded within some limits. It would 
be more appropriate that these were subject to moral restrictions or, following a contractual 
vision, to assume the sustainable development as an implicit moral agreement between 
generations (Barret, 1996; Howarth, 1997).  
The arguments stated in the previous section stress the necessity of going beyond the 
efficiency criterion of conventional analysis in order to achieve a sustainable development. 
However there are different views on this (good reviews of these can be found in Victor, 1991; 
Munda, 1997; or Neumayer, 1999). From an optimistic point of view, if any time that natural 
capital diminishes an increment of equivalent manmade capital takes place, then the capacity to 
maintain the quality of life would not be affected. This is known as the ‘weak sustainability’ 
criterion.
5
 It goes a bit further than conventional economic tools such as cost-benefit analysis 
because it denies the validity of the Hicks-Kaldor test in the intergenerational context and 
demands actual compensation if future generations would suffer from present actions 
                                                          
4 Pezzey (1989) already presented a long list of differing definitions for sustainable development. 






(Neumayer, 1999). However, it is based on the assumption of perfect substitution between 
different types of capital and keeps many of the limitations of conventional analysis. As section 
3.6 stresses, a sustainable development requires making the limits to substitution part of the 
analysis, and not making very uncertain assumptions that might jeopardize future generations. 
The respect for future generations interests leads this paper to claim for the implementation of 
the ‘strong sustainability’ requirement a criterion that requires the maintenance of the quantity 
and quality of natural capital over time, and of some critical levels of certain types of natural 
capital.
6
 Costanza (1994, p. 394) justifies it as a “…prudent minimum condition for assuring 
sustainability”. The ignorance and uncertainties about substitution possibilities imply that there 
is not a feasible way of putting into practice the weak sustainability criterion at global scale in 
order to assure sustainability. Local and regional indicators of weak sustainability can be useful 
but should be accompanied by global indicators of environmental sustainability. present 
generations will assure a fair treatment to future generations if the levels of the different types of 
capital do not diminish. 
A sustainable development implies a much more favorable distribution of rights for 
future generations. In spite of the obvious nature of this statement very few authors have 
subscribed to it. Page (1983) states that life opportunities of future generations will be 
undiminished if they inherit the same resource base as present generations inherited. Bromley 
(1989) analyses the possibility of undiminished stocks of natural resources and environmental 
quality for ensuring intergenerational justice. Finally, Howarth (1997) asserts that the provision 
of specific endowments of reproduced capital, technological capacity, natural resources and 
environmental quality may sustain life opportunities of future generations. Summing up, to 
guarantee future generations a fair treatment, the analysis should consider their right to a 
nondeteriorated socioeconomic and ecological capacity. The capacity of the present to alter the 
conditions of life of the future imposes this responsibility.  
 
                                                          





4.2. Recognizing the rights of the future: inalienability and compensation rules 
Two relevant rules through which recognizing future generations rights in present 
actions can be identified: the ‘inalienability rule’ and the ‘compensation rule’.
7
 The 
inalienability rule implies that the present cannot modify certain rights of future generations. 
The compensation rule implies that if present performance deteriorates the endowment of rights 
of future generations, an associate compulsory compensation should be carried out. Note that it 
differs from conventional Hicks-Kaldor criterion in that actual compensation is required. While 
the application of the first rule impedes a modification of the structure of rights, the second 
allows modifying it as if there were an exchange between the present and the future. 
The inalienability rule involves a much more restrictive use of the power in present 
decision making. However, although it is a stronger requirement, applying it when 
compensation is possible and sufficient for sustainability might lead to avoidable inefficiencies. 
The compensation rule leaves greater freedom to present decision-making.  In any case, the 
compensation possibility should be demonstrated by the present and, contrary to the 
conventional evaluation, the compensation should be established. Compensation to future 
generations should at least fulfill the weak sustainability requirement, that is to say, 
compensating the reduction of natural capital with the increase in another type of capital. But, as 
was argued above, at a global scale the application of the compensation rule should be 
consistent with the strong sustainability criterion. 
The recognition of rights to the future, with the application in each case of the necessary 
proceedings, requires new evaluation and management methods integrating the concerns 
expressed throughout this work as well as a strong institutional support reinforcing it.  
 
5. Evaluation incorporating the sustainability requirement 
                                                          
7 Bromley (1989) differentiates between property rule, liability rule, and inalienability rule. However, as he asserts 
“the property rule requires that the two parties arrange an exchange agreement ex ante…a difficult feat indeed.” (p. 






This section proposes the application of a new evaluation process incorporating the 
sustainability requirement. The recognition of rights implied by the sustainability requirement 
leads to incorporating into the analysis of intergenerational problems the obligation of 
maintaining the economic and ecological capacity that is currently enjoyed. This requires a 
different evaluation of policies and projects depending on whether the structure of rights 




5.1. Ordinary evaluation 
In the actions that only affect the generations taking the decision, conventional 
evaluation and management methods are essential for determining the most efficient allocation 
of resources. Nevertheless, there can be important distributive, ecological, moral, affective, 
contractual, deontological, cultural, or political reasons for society. These should also be 
considered in decision-making. As standard cost-benefit analysis follows only the allocative 
efficiency criterion, in some cases it could be appropriate to include it just as an element of a 
more complete decision-making process. 
 
5.2. Intergenerational evaluation 
When a project implies effects on generations not participating in the decision process, 
various cases should be differentiated. There are projects that will not negatively affect future 
generations, but there are also some that might harm them. This separation cannot be carried out 
with economic information alone: the necessity of considering geophysical and ecological 
realities turns the evaluation and management of sustainability into an interdisciplinary task. 
On the one hand, intergenerational projects not jeopardizing the capacity of the future, in 
principle, do not give rise to transaction of rights between generations and therefore do not 





assumed to enjoy any future consumption shows that conventional valuation is quite arbitrary. 
Following the reasoning of section 2, an intergenerational weighting should be applied that 
properly shows the preferences of current society regarding the consumption of future 
generations. 
On the other hand, any action jeopardizing the opportunities to be enjoyed by future 
generations implies a transaction of rights between generations. In each case it will be necessary 
to consider which form of fulfilling the obligations to the future is least costly to the present. 
The following relevant options could be considered: 
a. Not to carry out the project: If a project causes irreversible harmful effects to future 
generations and these cannot be avoided or compensated, it should be considered outside the 
choice of possibilities. The rights of the future will then be respected by applying the 
inalienability rule. This is the case of exploiting renewable resources indefinitely above their 
regeneration rate or overexploiting the assimilative capacity of the environment. In addition, 
when there are serious risks or uncertainties, the obligations with the future imply a bigger risk 
aversion in decision-making. Basic processes and some critical levels necessary for the 
sustenance of the ecological system should be protected by the inalienability rule. The 
information of different scientific disciplines should help to determine which goods require this 
protection. 
b. To undertake precautionary and control measures: This option also implies the application of 
the inalienability rule. If the modification of the structure of rights that the original project 
would imply is avoidable (e.g. enhancing security systems) and it is still profitable, this option 
is more appropriate than the first one. Conventional computation of costs and benefits (ignoring 
the future) often leads to ignoring the adoption of security measures or clean technologies, even 
if they could avoid severe damages to future generations. Present generations obligations imply 
that these measures should be included within the unavoidable costs of the project.  
                                                                                                                                                                          
8 Page (1997) arrives at similar conclusions and differentiates between ordinary and constitutional decisions while 





c. Compensation through an associated project: In some projects it is possible to compensate 
the harmful effects on future generations through an associated project (e.g. reforesting).
9
 The 
cost of the compensation should be included in the calculation of profitability, and the way in 
which this became effective should be articulated. Thus, the rights would be protected by the 
compensation rule, an exchange taking place between generations. In order to permit this 
transaction of rights a sine qua non requirement should be that decision-makers demonstrate that 
this compensation will be enough and will become effective. 
d. Financial compensation: This option would clearly modify the composition of the capacity 
bequeathed to future generations. There should not be doubts about the possibility of 
substituting the diminished resources and of establishing an investment fund allowing this 
future compensation.
10
 Thus, the damage caused to future generations must be quantifiable in 
monetary units or, at least, it must be possible to demonstrate that the compensation will, with 
all probability, be satisfactory. Again, and contrary to conventional methods, it should become 
effective.  
The evaluation process, outlined in Figure 1, should determine in each case which 
option is more appropriate and, as argued above, economic information is not enough for 
deciding this. Decision-makers should study whether the different options for recognizing the 
rights of future generations are more efficiently applied at local or regional scale, for groups of 
projects or even through macroeconomic policies. While at national or global scale the strong 
sustainability criterion must be completed, at regional or local scale less restrictive criteria 
might be applied. The appropriate option will depend on the particular characteristics of each 
project or group of projects, as well as on the conditions and specific needs of each region. In 
each case, the most appropriate scale and means of managing sustainability should be 
determined. 
  
                                                          
9 This option coincides with the proposal of Markandya and Pearce (1988) on shadow projects. 






6. The necessary reform and creation of institutions for a sustainable development 
This section analyses the reform and creation of institutions needed for a sustainable 
development. Conventional economic analysis ignores the interests of future generations and 
leads to an unsustainable economic performance. Political decisions often follow an even more 
shortsighted orientation. Moreover, present institutions and laws do not take into account future 
generations interests either. The recognition of rights to the future implied by sustainability and 
the consequent application of the new evaluation and management methods propounded in this 
paper will not be possible unless there is a strong institutional support enforcing them.  
 
6.1. The reform of the institutions that rule society 
The recognition of rights and the corresponding obligations need to be incorporated in 
the basic norms that rule the functioning of societies. As Doeleman and Sandler (1998) state, the 
sustainable management of the environment needs constitutional protection, in the same way 
that basic human rights and other institutional foundations of society do. The legislation should 
recognize the obligation of following management and evaluation processes consistent with 
sustainability, as stated above. The global impact of many environmental problems causes the 
need of applying this recognition in all countries in order to become effective, thus avoiding a 
situation where some free-riding countries or regions put global sustainability in danger. The 
constitutional imposition of limits to present performance should be determined following the 
information provided by diverse disciplines. Economics should look for the most efficient way 




6.2. The creation of institutions that watch over the rights of the future 
Nevertheless, the simple constitutional recognition of the rights of the future does not 
guarantee that these will be respected in present practice. future generations do not have 





adoption of sustainability as an equity commitment (recognizing certain rights to the future), 
requires institutions acting as representatives, defenders and tutors of these rights. These 
institutions should have the capacity to impose incentives and sanctions so that these rights are 
respected. Therefore, the creation of supranational institutions for controlling and negotiating 
the execution of the sustainability requirement at the global scale is necessary. In addition, there 
should be analogous institutions in the different countries and regions (acting at the most 
effective scale in each case).  These institutions should have, at least, the following functions: 
a. To control the different variables related to sustainability: Design and control of physical, 
biological, ecological, medical, economic and development indicators. 
b. To act as trusteeship and protector of the rights of future generations: They should watch 
over whether economic agents follow sustainable evaluation and management practices. These 
institutions should be given sanctioning power for acting effectively against the practices that 
jeopardize the rights of future generations. 
c. To articulate the compensations to future generations: In the event that, in following the new 
evaluation process, a transaction of rights between generations proves beneficial for everybody, 
the institutions representative of the future should take charge of the administration of the 
compensations that the future will enjoy. 
d. To incentivate and finance the change to sustainable practices: The new institutions should 
have the capacity to create the necessary incentives so that a change to sustainable practices 
takes place.  
The new institutions should not disturb the normal operation of ordinary evaluation and 
decision-making processes that do not negatively affect the recognized future rights of a 
nondeteriorated economic and ecological capacity. Nevertheless, in intergenerational projects 
they should impose an intergenerational evaluation consistent with sustainability, such as the 
one stated in the previous section. 
                                                                                                                                                                          
11 E.g. finding the most efficient way to avoid “dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system”, the 





The severity of current environmental problems causes the urgent need of adopting 
commitments, both at international scale and in regional and local communities, in the sense 
indicated in this section. Unfortunately, the current situation is far from the recommended 
scenario (a clear example is the fiasco of The Hague 2000, and the later abandonment by the 
USA government of the final modest agreement of Berlin 2001 for the application of the Kyoto 
Protocol). There are major difficulties as some countries or communities may feel they have 
incentives to free-ride and ruin the timid advances made. 
As for the financing of this institutional framework, the current benefits gained by using 
the resources belonging to everybody (present and future) should finance the protection of these 
resources for the enjoyment of their future owners. The institutions representative of future 
generations should guarantee this, and the same institutions should study the most efficient 
financing mechanisms to fulfill the proposed objective (e.g. energy and carbon taxes, tradable 
pollution permits, etc...). Most global environmental problems have been mainly caused by 
industrialized countries, while the most susceptible receivers of their worst effects are the third 
world countries. The abatement of the accumulated costs imposed on the global environment 
should be financed mainly by the richest countries, because they have been the beneficiaries of 
its overexploitation through appropriating the property rights and making a destructive use of 




Conventional economic analysis treats future generations unfairly. The alternatives 
usually suggested in the literature do not incorporate the complexity of intergenerational 
problems either. This paper argues that a coherent alternative needs to introduce the existence of 
different generations in the analysis and to take appropriately into account the preferences 
concerning future generations consumption. However, this does not ensure a sustainable 
development. To deal with intergenerational problems it is essential to overcome the strong 





generations or the assumption of infinite substitution possibilities). The present study concludes 
that, in order to ensure a fair treatment to future generations, we should recognize and protect 
their right to enjoy at least the same capacity of economic and ecological resources that present 
generations enjoy. Sustainability would then be assumed as an equity commitment with future 
generations. With this purpose, the paper proposes an alternative evaluation process coherent 
with the sustainability requirement. In this process, the information of different disciplines is of 
critical importance in order to follow the most efficient way of respecting the rights of future 
generations. Some economists’ assumptions about uncertain and unknown questions should be 
substituted by the integration of interdisciplinary information and more prudence. 
Finally, as future generations do not have representation in present markets and 
institutions, if their rights are to be respected, and the proposed evaluation process applied, the 
appropriate mechanisms and institutions should be established. The paper stresses some of the 
functions and powers that these institutions should have in order to reinforce the recognition of 
rights claimed above in order to achieve a sustainable development. The benefits that (part of) 
present society obtains from the use of resources that (also) belong to the future should finance 
the institutional structure that allows its sustainable administration.  
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Figure 1. The evaluation process. 
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